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Abstract

the authorization can be automatically revoked when
the associated time expires. By the hierarchical relationships along with the partial orders defined in APS,
we also provide a mechanism for conflict resolutions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Sections 2,3 and 4, we describe the basic definitions
of our model including those of APS. In Section 5, we
present the XML Temporal Delegation Authorization.
In Section 6, we discuss the conflict resolution. In
Section 7, we investigate the conflict resolution while
the authorization propagation is assumed. In Section
8, we conclude this paper.

In a large system, XML documents associated with it
can be large and complicated. To manage access control in such a large and complicated system is very
difficult. Recently, Access Policy Sheet (APS) [6] was
introduced to provide a solution to access control for
large XML systems. In this paper, we proposed a temporal access control scheme in APS where the propagation of authorization rights is assumed. The authorization policies can be automatically revoked when
the associated time expires. We also provide conflict
resolutions for our temporal authorization system.
Keywords: XML, Access control, Temporal authorization
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Introduction

Definitions of the vocabularies
in DTD

In this section, we define our access control model.
We give the definitions of DTD, APS, and associated
system components including subjects, objects, authorization rights, and types.

XML has been widely applied to manage Internet information. An XML document system could be very
large and complicated and its security protection could
be also very difficult. Protecting such an XML system
requires a sound access control mechanism, which provides formalisms for specifying, analyzing and evaluating security policies that determine how an access
right is granted and delegated among particular users.
Recently, researchers [2, 3, 4] have become increasingly interested in developing authorization models which are flexible and expressive enough so as to
handle the specification and enforcement of multiple
policies. [1, 5, 9] have provided some ideas developing XML authorization models which are flexible and
expressive enough for handling the specification and
enforcement of multiple policies. However, those models are very complicated and difficult to realize. In
our previous work, Access Policy Sheet (APS) [6], has
been introduced. This model provides a simple and
dynamic scheme for XML authorization management.
However, temporal authorization [8] and authorization
propagation have still not been investigated in XML
based access control systems including APS. In this paper, we present some new properties in APS including
temporal authorization, conflict resolutions and the
time dependency which can handle temporal access
control policies and policy propagation. In our model,

2.0.1

Subject

A subject is active. It could be a user or a processor. A
subject has a name and other associated information
dependent on the application. We require subjects to
be either ordered with a proper order or unordered
when the order of subjects are insignificant.
Subject Set.
Subject constant poset (S, >):
admin, s1 , s2 , · · · , sn denote ordered subjects with the
order of admin > s1 > s2 > · · · > sn . We assume that
the administrator possesses the highest privilege.
A subject can be defined according to the need.
For example, a subject could be described by set of
attributes such as name, address, rights, etc. As the
simplest example, in DTD, the subject is defined as:
<!DOCTYPE subject[
<!ELEMENT
subject
<!ELEMENT
users
<!ELEMENT
name
]>

(users*)>
(name)>
#PCDATA>

The attribute to the above subject set contains only
the usernames.
1
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Object

Objects are passive. They could be files, programs, tables, etc. Objects are represented by a constant poset
(O,>): o1 , o2 , · · · with the order o1 > o2 , > ... The
object is described as target + path(V, E), where
target is an XML document or URL address, path
is an XPath expression that eventually selects specific
portions (object) of the XML document in the XML
tree where V is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges.
The structure of the objects could be defined in the
DTD as follows.
<!DOCTYPE
<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT
<!ELEMENT
]>

object[
object
target
path

In this section, we give the definitions of the predicates
of grant, delegate and cangrant for describing the
delgatable authorizations.
Definition 1 (grant ) grant is a 5 -tuple predicate
|S| × |O| × |T | × |A| × |S| .
grant(s,o,t,a,g) : grantee s is granted by grantor g
the access right a on object o with authorization type
t. We can use XML to define the structure of rule
Grant In the delegation process, the entity that has
been given the access right to delegate by another entity, who has the access right, can perform valid delegations. The following is the definition of our delegable
rules. Predicate grant in XML is an authorization
rule, where the element grant with attributes grantee;
object,authorization type; access rights; grantor and
status. Here,

(target,path)>
href #PCDATA>
#PCDATA>

In our XML access control model, the object are
the nodes of the DOM tree. We allow the objects
are ordered.The order of object is given by tree
inheritance relation.

2.0.3

grantor ∈ S,
grantee ∈ S,
target+path ∈ O,
authorization_type ∈ {+|-|*},
where +,-,* denote allow, deny, and delegable, respectively.
access_right ∈ {r, w,...},
status ∈{true, false}

Access Rights

The order of access right is given by a priority hierarchy relation. In our model, we define the object with
the access right of write will automatically have the
access right of read, so we have the partial order: read
> write. That is, if a user has a write right on an
object, then he will have a read right on it as well.
Ordered rights are defined as a constant poset (A,
>): a1 , a2 , · · · with the order: a1 > a2 > ... For example, Read > Write > Executable. They are defined
in DTD as follows.

Definition 2 (cangrant) cangrant (s,o,a): subject s
has the right to grant access a on object o to other
subjects.
cangrant is a 3-tuple predicate |S| × |O| × |A|,
where S is a set of subjects which is a grantor or
a grantee; O = target + path(V, E), target is an
XML or URL, path is an XPath expression that eventually selects specific portions (object) of the XML document in XML tree where V is a set of nodes and E
is a set of edges; A is the set of access rights. Here,

<!DOCTYPE access_right[
<!ELEMENT access_right (a*) #IMPLIED>
]>
2.0.4

Predicates

subject ∈ S,
target+path ∈ O,
access_right ∈ {read, write,a1,a2,...}
status ∈{true, false}

Authorization Type

The ordered authorization types are described in
DTD:

Definition 3 (delegate) Delegate is a 4-tuple predicate :|S| × |S| × |O| × |A| rule, where S is a set of
subjects which is a grantor or a grantee; O = target
+ path(V, E), target is an XML or DTD, path is an
XPath expression that eventually selects specific portions (object) of the XML document in XML tree where
V is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges; A is the
set of access rights. Here,

<!DOCTYPE authorization_type[
<!ELEMENT authorization_type
(+|-|*) #REQUIRED>
]>
Authorization type is given by the constant
set T = {+, −, ∗}, where + specifies grant w.r.t.
an access right, − is the negation w.r.t. an access
right, and ∗ specifies “delegable” w.r.t. an access right.

grantor ∈ S,
grantee ∈ S,
target+path ∈ O,
access_right ∈ {read, write,a1,a2,...},
2

status ∈{true, false}
delegate(g,s,o,a): subject g has directly or indirectly granted subject s access a on object o with delegable type.
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To provide fine grained specification in XML, we
utilize the XPath expression to identify the structure
of the tree. An Xpath expressions on an XML document tree is a sequence of element name or predefined functions separated by the character: for the one
branch of the tree: o1-o2-o4, node o4 can be expressed
as /o1/o2/o4/ and we have the partial order: /o1/
>/o1/o2/ >/o1/o2/o4/.
In general, we have the object partial order
chain: /root/ > /root/ child of root/ > ... >
/root/child of root/grandchild of root/.../.
For example:
//hospital/ > //hospital/room-info/ >
//hospital/room-info/patient/.

Authorization Rules in APS

Directly using XML to describe access control often
shows little advantage when the access control system is complicated (e.g., when authorization delegation and propagation are required). In our model, authorization specifications or rules are provided in an
Authorization Policy Sheet (APS) associated with the
document/DTD. In APS, the representation of authorizations is described in terms of orders of the objects
and subjects and explicit authorization rules.
The APS is separate from the document and DTD
and offers great convenience in the administration of
access control for system administrators due to its simplicity. The system administrator can manage the system access control by the concise rules given in an
APS. The resultant XML sheet can be generated from
the corresponding DTD and APS. APS also shows the
great advantage due to its convenience in the specification of explicit rights and the implicit rights for XML
documents.
The partial orders of the access control components,
including subjects, object, types, and rights, are one
of the key components in an APS. We will see that
they can be used to simplify our access control system
by implicit rules in authorization propagations.
The following figure of the XML DOM tree expresses
the hierarchy relation of the objects.

Thus, the order of the ancestor nodes in a DOM
tree are always greater than the order of the descendant nodes.
An APS sheet consists of a finite set of rules and
orders. A rule consists of name, head and attribute.
When the head of a rule is an authorization predicate,
the rule is called authorization rule. For a set of rules
named r, each rule consists of a predicate and an attribute:
<p, attribute> <- <condition>
Here, p1, p2,...,pn are a set of predicates and
attribute denotes the components associated with
the predicate. condition denotes the condition with
respect to the rule of a predicate. Due to the space
limit, we will omit the details in this paper and will
present it in the full version of the paper.
The structure of rule in DTD is defined as following:

O1

O3

O2

O4

<!DOCTYPE rule[
<!ELEMENT
rule (predicate+,condition*)>
<!ELEMENT
predicate (grant, cangrant )
#IMPLIED>
<!ELEMENT
condition (gran, cangrant)*>
]>

O5

O6

Figure 1: DOM tree, where each node represents an
object.
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Now let’s see how to to determine the orders of the
objects. According to the structure of the DOM tree.
In our model, the root node has the greatest order
in any order chain. We can describe the hierarchy
relation as following: o1 is the root of the tree, o2
and o3 are the descendant nodes of o1, o4 and o5 are
the children nodes of o2 and the grandchildren nodes
of o1, o6 is the child node of o3 and the grandchild
nodes of o1,
So, we have o1 > o2 > o4, o1 > o3 > o6, and o1
> o2 > o5.

Access Policy Sheet (APS) allows an administrator
to manage the rules separated from XML documents
and DTD. APS consists of a finite set of rules. R =
{r1 , r2 , ...., rn }, A rule consists of a set of predicates
and conditions associated with the predicates. r =
(P, C), where P = {p1, p2, ...., pn} denotes a set
of predicates and C denotes a set of conditions. We
describe a rule in APS as,
<p, attributes> <- <coditions>
where p is a predicate of arity n in P.
3

Syntax of Temporal Authorizations

Temporal authorizations enforce a rule to have
tenable validity. Formally, we add a time interval ∆i
to a rule, e.g., ri = (P, C)(∆i ), where ri is the temporal rule which has a temporal argument ∆i defined as
∆i = (si , ei ) . si is the start time and ei is the end
time.
In APS, we define a temporal rule as
<p, attributes>
<- <coditions><time interval>
For example,

<target>hospital_info.xml
</target>
<path>//nurse/operation_info
</path>
</object>
<access_right> read </access_right>
</cangrant>
<validity>
<start> 09-10-05 </start>
<end> 11-10-05 </end>
</validity>
</rule>

<garnt, Alice, patient_info.xml,
//Star_Hospital/operation_info,
+, read&write, Bob> <<cangrant, Bob,
*+//Star_Hospital/operation_info,
read>
<09/10/05,11/10/05>

6

Conflict Resolution

Since both positive and negative authorizations can
co-exist in our system, conflict resolution among rules
must be considered. Also, since we allow implicit authorization (authorization via authorization propagation), implicit conflicts make the problem more complicated. The policy of “the most specific subject(or
object) takes precedence” which is proposed by E.
Bertino [1] cannot be adapted to our model. In fact,
according to the inherence hierarchy relation in the
partial order chain, we can get the policy of the “the
least specific takes precedence”. The basic idea of solving conflicts is outlined as follows.

This rule is applied to predicate grant, condition
cangrant and the validity period of the authorization which contains the start time and the end time.
Grantee Alice has the access right read and write
on the Xpath specified object hospital info.xml,
with the Xpath //Star Hospital/operation info.
Grantor Bob has the authorization to grant read on
the all files of the same directory to others. The validity period of the rule is 09/10/05-11/10/05.
According to the structure defined in the associated DTD (omitted), the authorization will be able to
be converted to the standard XML as follows.

6.1

General Rules

Using delegation relation. According to the delegation relation, if subject s delegates subject s’ directly
or indirectly an authorization on object o and access
right a, then, when a conflict w.r.t o and a occurs, the
authorization from s (i.e. s is the grantor) will always
override the one from s’.
From authorization type inheritance. For two
conflicting authorizations w.r.t. a subject, an object,
and an access right, according to the inheritance hierarchy of authorization type − > + > ∗, the authorization with a lower partial order will override the one
with a higher type order.
From subject inheritance. For two conflicting authorizations w.r.t. an object, a right, and an authorization type, according to the inheritance hierarchy
of subjects, if s> s’, then the authorization w.r.t. s
will override the inherited one with s’.
From object inheritance. For two conflicting authorizations w.r.t. a right, a grantor, and a grantee,
we consider the object inheritance relation. According
to the inheritance hierarchy of objects, if o > o’, then
the authorization on o will override the inherited one
on o’.
From access right inheritance. For two conflicting authorizations w.r.t. a grantor, a grantee, and an
object, according to the inheritance hierarchy of access rights, if a > a’, then the authorization on a will

<rule>
<grant>
<subject>
<grantee>
<name> Alice</name>
</grantee>
</subject>
<object >
<target>hospital_info.xml</target>
<path>//nurse/operation_info>/path>
</object>
<authorization_type>
+ </authorization_type>
<access_right> read </access_right>
<access_right> write</access_right>
<subject>
<grantor>
<name> Bob</name>
</grantor>
</subject>
</grant>
<condition>
<cangrant>
<subject>
<grantee>
<name> Alice </name>
</grantee>
</subject>
<object >

4
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override the inherited one on a’.

6.2

The Scheme for Temporal Authorizations

Conflict Resolution with Authorization Propagation

Authorization propagation is implemented in terms of
the partial order of subjects, objects and access rights.
As defined in [4], we allow the implicit rules derived
from the explicit rules in terms of partial ordering.

According to the definition of temporal authorization
in the preceding section, we denote by ri (∆i ) the temporal authorization, where ∆i = (si , ei ) is the validity
period of rule ri , si is the start time, and ei is the end
time. Our conflict resolution is twofold: resolution
without the time factor (given in the preceding section) and resolution with the consideration of the time
factor. For example, for two conflict authorizations
ri (∆i ) and rj (∆j ), we consider the conflict resolution
of the ri and rj omitting the time factor first, using the
methods we discussed in the preceding section. Then,
we consider the time factors ∆i and ∆j . We denote
by φ the time overlap of two temporal authorizations,
i.e., φ = ∆i ∩ ∆j , by ⇒ an override operator, and by
⇔ a conflict operator.
Suppose we have two rules ri (∆i ) ⇔ rj (∆j ), where
∆i = (si , ei ), ∆j = (sj , ej ). If φ 6= 0, we have the
following cases.
When si = sj and ei = ej , then we have
½
ri ⇒ rj : ri (si , ei )
rj ⇒ ri : rj (sj , ej )

O1

O3

O2
r2

r4’

O4
r4

Figure 2: Rule propagation in a DOM tree.
Figure 2 shows an XML DOM tree, where object
o1 is the root of the tree, o4 and o2 are the nodes on
one branch of the tree. o4 is the descent node of o2.
According to the partial order rule of the propagation
on the objects we introduced before, there exists a
partial order relation o2 > o4.
Suppose that in APS there are two authorization
rules r4 and r2 actively applied to o4 and o2, respec0
tively. With authorization propagation, r4 is derived
from r4 . The authorization rule w.r.t. o2 is then af0
0
fected by r4 . If r4 is in conflict with r2 , then r4 is also
in conflict with r2 . The conflict resolution discussed
in Section 4.1 is still applicable.
We now discuss it further by considering the time
factor. Suppose that the above authorizations are temporal rules, r4 (∆4 ) and r2 (∆2 ). For o2, r40 (∆4 ) derived
from r4 (∆4 ) is also applied. Consequently, we have
½
r4 (∆4 ) ⇔ r2 (∆2 )
: r40 (∆4 ) 6⇔ r2 (∆2 )
∆4 ∩ ∆2 = 0

which means two conflict authorizations completely
overlap. If ri ⇒ rj , then we have ri (si , ei ). If rj ⇒ ri ,
then we have rj (sj , ej ). The following cases are selfexplanatory; therefore, we omit the explanation.
In the case of si 6= sj , ei = ej , we have
½
ri ⇒ rj : ri (si , ei ), rj (sj , si )
rj ⇒ ri : rj (sj , ej )
In the case of si = sj , ei 6= ej , we have
½
ri ⇒ rj : ri (si , ei )
rj ⇒ ri : rj (sj , ej ), ri (ej , ei )

and
½

In the case of si 6= sj , ei 6= ej , we have
½
ri ⇒ rj : ri (si , ei )
rj ⇒ ri : rj (sj , ej ), ri (si , sj ), ri (ej , ei )

½

When si > sj , ei > ej , we have
½
ri ⇒ rj : ri (si , ei ), rj (ei , ej )
rj ⇒ ri : ri (si , sj ), ri (sj , ej )

r4 (∆4 ) ⇔ r2 (∆2 )
:
∆4 ∩ ∆2 6= 0

r40 (∆4 ) 6⇔ r2 (∆2 ); (no overlap)
r40 (∆4 ) ⇔ r2 (∆2 ); (overlap)

Here, we give an example. Suppose that in XML
document medical.xml, there are two nodes in the
DOM tree, //hospital/room-info/ and it’s child
node //hospital/room-info/patient/, According
to the hierarchy relation of the objects, we have a partial order relation:
//hospital/room-info/ >
//hospital/room/patient/.
Assume that r1 (∆1 ) and r2 (∆2 ) are two temporal rules
w.r.t. the above objects respectively.

If there is no time overlap between two conflict authorizations, then each rule is taken separately without
any influence from the other.
½
ri ⇔ rj
: ri (∆i ), rj (∆j )
∆i ∩ ∆j = 0
5

r1 (∆1 ) :
<grant, Alice,medical.xml,
//hospital/room-info/,+,read,Bob>
(01/04/05,01/07/05)
r2 (∆2 ) :
<grant, Alice,medical.xml,
//hospital/room-info/patient/,-,read,Bob>
(01/06/05,01/12/05)
Through the propagation, r20 (∆2 ) is derived from
r2 (∆2 ). That is, r20 (∆2 ) :
<grant, Alice, medical.xml+
//hospital/room-info/,-,read,Bob>
(01/06/05,01/12/05)
Obviously, for the same object
medical.xml+//hospital/room-info/,
r20 (∆2 ) is in conflict with r1 (∆1 ).
∆1 =
(s1 , e1 ) = (01/04/05, 01/07/05) and ∆2 = (s2 , e2 ) =
(01/06/05, 01/12/05) follow the case, s2 > s1 and
e2 > e1 . According to the conflict resolution we analyzed in section 4.2, r1 will override r20 in the period
of 01/04/05 to 31/05/05 and r20 will override r1 in the
period of /01/06/05 to 01/12/05.
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Conclusion

Access control in XML documents is very complicated
and difficult to manage. Access Policy Sheet (APS)
provide us with a concise methodology to resolve the
problem. In this paper, we proposed a temporal APS
which can handle time related authorizations including conflict resolution, authorization delegation, authorization propagation. Based on our previous work
, our new model can be used to satisfy the temporal
requirement for XML authorizations.
This paper presents a compositional formal framework
for the specification of our temporal access control
policies. With a temporal intervals of validity, the authorization would automatically revoked when the associated temporal interval expires. By the hierarchical
relationships along with the partial orders defined in
APS, we had given the conflict resolutions in several
conditions.
Our contribution makes APS be able to handle more
complicated XML access control systems and our
scheme exhibits significant simplicity to the XML system management.
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